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Abstract— Formal systems verification of autonomous 
underwater vehicles (AUV) is addressed in this paper. 
Verification includes hybrid system modelling, discrete 
abstractions, control systems abstractions, checking of 
reachability of undesirable states by formal model checking. 
The main contribution of the paper is to show how first 
multilayered hybrid system modelling, then its representation 
and discretisation in StateflowTM, can be automatically 
compiled into interpreted script (ISPL) of the multi-agent 
model checker system (MCMAS) for verification. Using this 
technique, modelling and model checking can include the 
complete physical system of the autonomous vehicle, its multi-
agent software on board and also the human interface 
represented as an agent. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
UV mission aborts are very costly. If a vehicle 
performs seafloor survey at a depth of 3000m and 
aborts its mission then at 2m/s speed at 30 degrees rise it 
takes an hour to surface and several hours if surfacing by 
positive buoyancy. Adding to this the hours spent on 
diagnosis and repair the mission delay can be half a day at a 
cost of about £1000 per hour [1]. Part of the reason for this 
is that an AUV is an engineering platform that contains 
many different subsystems that were not designed to work 
together. The system engineer needs to design an inherently 
reliable vehicle from individual parts that are reliable in 
themselves. A mission is deemed successful when the 
vehicle surfaces at the end of its mission without any 
irrecoverable faults during the mission and, even more 
importantly, all data are stored onboard. Very few 
publications are available on reliability of AUVs, the two 
major studies available are [2] and [3]. Also a report of the 
Autosub Loss Inquiry Board [4] supports these findings. [2] 
summarizes 14 years of experience with Autosub I and II 
[5], during which 240 missions were completed. The authors 
in [3] classify the cause of failures as: 
(A) Hardware component failures (electronics hardware, 
mechanical problems, pressure vessel leaks, bad GPS, 
acoustic telemetry, power supply problems); 
(B) Hardware component failure in combination with 
unusual external interference (acoustic interference, bad 
GPS ); 
(C) Vehicle operational errors (collision with vessel, 
software errors, failure to dive); 
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(D) Human operational errors during preparation, launch 
and recovery; 
(A)-(D) classes mean different dimensions of the system 
that must be controlled to avoid failures. One can also 
classify failures by saying (a) which subsystem failed 
(power, communication, control electronics, mechanical 
system, payload) (b) which functionality has been affected 
(maneuverability, descend, ascend, ability to perform 
mission steps, ability to provide functional environment for 
payload, etc.) (c) how severely the failure is (no action 
needed, human action needed, not critical, moderately 
critical, critical, unrecoverable vehicle). 
In [6] a software (RECOVERY) is reported that offers 
practical self-diagnostics for AUVs. [7] presents a 
systematic method of verification for an AUV as a hybrid 
system. Self-diagnostic  approaches are effective if one has a 
a vehicle without any major breakdowns so that the vehicle 
has only recovarable faults. This paper addresses the 
problem of building a functioning vehicle that increases the 
chance that faults are recoverable. As such this research is 
complementary to self-diagnostics approaches.  
Section II presents the outline structure of the integrity 
and fault assessment system (IFAS) as a hybrid systems 
modelling problem. Section III describes the process of 
creating a discrete event model via discrete abstractions. 
Section IV shows how the discrete event system can be 
compiled for use in a multi-agent model checker system. 
Section V illustrates some of the modelling and code 
involved before conclusions are drawn.  
II. INTEGRITY AND FAULT ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 
 waterfall model of the IFAS development process (see 
Fig. 1.) is enumerated in the following: 
1) A formal model is defined for the examined 
autonomous system. 
2) The model is refined for adapting it to a mainstream 
model checker. The extensive refinement consists in a 
discrete abstraction of the hybrid system model and a 
conversion of the design into a formalism accepted by the 
model checking tool. 
3) The requirements of the system are analyzed, hence 
asserting the properties that the design must satisfy. The 
specifications to be verified are formulated in the model 
checker’s logical formalism. 
4) The model checker is used to verify whether these 
requirements are satisfied or whether bugs exist. The 
consequences of partial or complete faults in physical 
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components are also tested. 
5) If the verification stage of the model checking produces 
counter examples (to demonstrate possible faults) consisting 
of an execution trace [8], then the design process is resumed 
to extend and/or to refine the modelled system. 
 
Research efforts in the area of autonomous systems [9, 
10] have shown that most successful approaches need to 
abstract out parts of the system. To avoid using hybrid 
automatons in the modelling process (as a basis of modelling 
the overall system) is crucial as that helps to avoid the “curse 
of dimensionality” and therefore poor overall effectiveness 
of verification. Modularization, where systems are 
composed of subsystems connected by finite state inputs and 
outputs, can be assessed for reliability on the basis of the 
reliability of their component subsystems. This way the total 
reliability of a complex system can be evolved from bottom 
up. 
 
Various definitions of hybrid systems exist in the 
literature (see [11-15]). In the following a generic denotation 
of the hybrid system is used. 
A hybrid system or automaton is a tuple 
H  V, X, f, Init, Inv, E, Grd, R, where: 
V represents a finite set of locations or discrete states; 
X   is a set of continuous states; 
f: V  X  2 is a vector field of flow determining the 
continuous dynamics; 
Init  V  X is the set of initial states; 
Inv: V  2assigns to each discrete state an invariant  
      set; 
E  V  V is a set of edges; 
Grd: E  2 is a guard condition; 
R: E  X  2 is a reset map. 
Each discrete state l has a set of initial states x 
X | l, x  Init!, a vector field fl, x   and an invariant 
set Invl   associated with it. Starting from the initial 
value corresponding to the discrete states, the continuous 
state evolves in time satisfying the condition x"  fl, x. The 
continuous state can evolve as long as it remains in the 
invariant set, i.e. in the domain of permitted evolution within 
a discrete state. When the continuous state x reaches the 
guard conditions Grd#,#$   of the edge l, l%  E, the 
switching of the discrete states occurs from l to l%; at the 
same time the continuous state is reset to a value 
in R#,#$x  . 
Finite discrete systems can be obtained from hybrid 
systems by abstraction. The abstraction process can help to 
produce a less complex but less detailed model of the hybrid 
system [16], while maintaining the properties of interest. If 
the properties of interest are preserved by the obtained finite 
discrete system, then the verification of this abstracted 
system should be equivalent to checking the same property 
on the original system [12]. 
A transformation or parsing process applied to an 
abstracted system may be necessary such that the system to 
comply with the formalism accepted by the model checking 
tool. The desired property or requirement to be verified is to 
be formulated in terms of state sets. 
Rediscretization demands can arise if a system does not 
meet the decidability requirement. In this case partitioning of 
the state space needs to be continued by further abstraction 
of the model. The decidability requirement is met, if for a 
given model of the system, there exists a computational or 
algorithmic approach, that can determine whether the system 
satisfies the desired property [12] in a finite number of steps. 
III. CREATING A DISCRETE EVENT MODEL VIA DISCRETE 
ABSTRACTIONS 
1) Labeled transition systems (LTS) 
The finite abstraction of a hybrid system generates a 
labeled transition system. The labeled transition system [17, 
18] is a tuple &'  (, Σ, , (* , +, ,, (- where ( is the finite set of states; 
Σ is the alphabet of event (actions); 
 (  Σ  ( is the set of transition relations; 
(*  ( is a set of initial states; + is a countable set of labels; 
,: (  + is the labeling function; 
(*  (-  is a set of final states; 
A transition ./, 0, .1  (  Σ  ( is denoted as 
 ./ 2 .1, where ./ is the predecessor of state .1 and .1 is a 
successor of ./ at the occurrence of event/action 0. 
Taking into account a formulation in terms of a multi-
agent system, the transition system &'  (, Σ, , (* , +, ,, (- is decomposed into parallel constituents, such 
that &'  &3456 7 8  7 &3459 , n  :. The components of the 
 
Fig. 2. Autosub 6000 of the National Oceanography Centre at the 
University of Southampton that can reach an ocean depth of 6km. 
 
Fig. 1. IFAS development stages. 
  
 
transition system &'  are the transition systems with tuple 
&345;  <(345; , Σ345; , , (*=>?; , +345; , ,345; , (-=>?;@ , A 1, … , D. 
A state . of the &'  transition system is denoted by .  ./, … , .E  (, where (  (3456  …  (3459 .  
State . of the overall transition system &'  is a global state 
of the multi-agent system with all FGH/, … , FGHE! agents 
active at any time. 
 
2) Natural language programming using System English 
(sEnglish) 
Natural language programming (NLP) in sEnglish [16] is 
used for abstraction of continuous states to discrete states. 
NLP facilitates an intellectual problem formulation in 
English. NLP in system English (sEnglish) is a theoretically 
well founded method to record relationships of models and 
procedures on board of an autonomous vehicle. A major 
advantage of using the NLP paradigm is that it opens up the 
potentials of the human brain’s natural abstraction ability of 
our environment.  
An NLP-based natural-language-agent model uses a MOL 
(machine ontology language) ontology and states operational 
mode attributes and transitions in terms of human concepts 
in sentences while permitting unambiguous translation into a 
formal agent definition. Natural language programming 
advocates the top-down method for problem formulation. 
The top level sentence creates the shell of the generic agent 
and is defined by a sequence of other sentences that use 
concepts from the ontology. Every sentence that has been 
used is defined in terms of other sentences, or by a simple 
sentence that executes code written in an associated high 
level programming language. 
In our approach NLP is used to formulate the functionality 
of the AUV at various abstraction levels and to link the 
labeled transition system’s discrete abstractions to an 
embedded systems industry standard format 
(Stateflow/Simulink) and to the input language 
representation of a model checker for multi-agent systems 
(MCMAS).  
The concept of an agent by means of LTS abstraction is 
defined by its set of operational modes, its set of event 
attributes and the set of possible transition relations: 
(1) The operational mode concept refers to the local states 
that an agent can find itself in during its operation. The set of 
operational modes of an agent can be defined by the name of 
its finite local states; or in terms of local variable valuations. 
(2) The event attribute concept grasps the relationship 
between the LTS set of action labels, that when assigned to a 
local state by the labeling function will result a consequent 
set of triggered events. 
(3) The concept of transition relation shows the possible 
evolution of the agent from one local state to another. The 
components of transition relation’s concept are therefore, the 
source local (predecessor) state from where the agent 
evolves into the destination local (successor) state, at the 
occurrence of an event that is being triggered when an agent 
performs an action assigned to its source local state. 
The ontology used for the conceptual representation of the 
labeled transition system provide the type of objects, their 
properties and relations, that are processed and transposed 
into the Stateflow ontology representation to create the 
discrete event system representation as Stateflow charts. 
The discrete event system representation in Stateflow has 
been intended for the purpose to execute the simulations of 
the discrete event system in the Stateflow environment. In 
case of a low abstraction level of the agent functionalities 
with high implementation details, the Stateflow chart 
illustration may also provide means of automatic code 
generation and deployment to embedded targets as stand-
alone applications. 
A higher abstraction level of the multi-agents system with 
less implementation details is used in the interpreted systems 
input language of the model checker MCMAS, in order to 
test the correctness of the agent’s operations. 
 
3) Stateflow formalism 
The SimulinkTM and StateflowTM software tools developed 
by Mathworks became an industry standard and is a popular 
choice for modelling hybrid systems and embedded 
applications. Stateflow charts allow the creation of discrete 
state transition systems based on hierarchical state machines. 
Simulink blocks provide the ability to model the continuous 
dynamics corresponding to the discrete states. 
Adopting the notation from [19], a Stateflow chart is 
described by the tuple IJ  K, L, I, JMH, &, N, where 
K  KO P K* P KQ is a finite set of typed variables 
representing data objects in the Stateflow chart; K is 
partitioned into input variables KO , output variables K* and 
local variables KQ; L  LO P L* P LQ  is a finite set of events, partitioned 
according to its scope property into events LO  that are input 
to the Stateflow chart, events L* that are output from the 
chart, and events LQ that are local to the Stateflow chart; I is a finite set of states, where each state is a tuple 
I  RDHST UMHAVD, RWAH UMHAVD, XYSADG UMHAVD, VD RZRDH UMHAVD.  
An action can contain a function call, can be an 
assignment of an expression to a variable or can be an event 
broadcast. 
JMH is a finite set of MatlabTM or graphical functions that 
can be included as a call statement in the expression of a 
state’s RDHST UMHAVD, RWAH UMHAVD, XYSADG UMHAVD or 
VD RZRDH UMHAVD; 
& is a finite set of transitions, where each transition is a 
tuple &  [SM, X[H, R, M, MU, HU. [SM  I represents the source 
state, X[H  I is the destination state, R  L is an event, M is 
the condition expression, MU is the condition action and HU is 
the transition action; 
N: I  UDX, VS!  2\ is a mapping from the finite set 
of states to the Cartesian product of the states’ 
decomposition type and the power set of I. Parallel UDX 
state decomposition represents states at the appropriate level 
in the hierarchy that are always active at the same time. 
  
 
Exclusive VS decomposition describes states that are 
mutually exclusive. 
]  2\  ^  represents the configuration of a Stateflow 
chart and is a tuple consisting of the set of active states and a 
valuation for all the variables from the finite set K. ^ 
denotes the set of all valuations of a variable set K. 
 
4) MCMAS 
MCMAS is a model checker for multi-agent systems, 
intended for the automatic verification of formulae with 
temporal and epistemic properties in deontic interpreted 
systems (DIS). 
MCMAS uses an extended variant of an interpreted 
system’s formalism [20]. Each agent from a system of 
agents can be modelled by means of a set of local states, a 
set of actions, a protocol and an evolution function [21, 22]. 
An agent A (i  1, … , D!, D  :) is characterized by a finite 
set of local states L`, and by a finite set of actions Act`. The 
protocol P`  is a rule that establishes which action can be 
performed by an agent in a given local state. The protocol 
function P` d L` 2Afg;  assigns a set of actions to a local 
state. The evolution function  t` : L`  Lh  Act/  … ActE Acth  L` determines how the local state of an agent 
evolves based on the agent’s local state, on the local state of 
a special agent E modelling the environment, and on the 
actions of all agents. 
As addressed in [21] and [22], an element g  S of the 
Cartesian product of the agents’ local states S  L/  … LE  Lh is called a global state. An element α  Act of the 
Cartesian product of the agents’ action  Act  Act/  … ActE  Acth  is a tuple of actions and is referred to as a joint 
action. The evolution of the global states of the system is 
described by the function t: S  Act  S. An element g  S 
represents a global state. Hence, given a global state g, the 
local state of agent i in the global state g is denoted by the 
symbol l`G. 
Given a set I  S of possible initial global states, the 
protocols and the evolution functions generate a set G  S of 
reachable global states, obtained by all the possible runs of 
the system. Given a set of atomic propositions P, the 
evaluation relation V  S  P completes the description of 
the interpreted system. 
Interpreted systems were extended to include the notion of 
correct behaviour [23]. According to this extension, the set 
of local states Lm is partitioned into the non-empty set Gm of 
allowed or correct states, and a set Rm of disallowed states, 
such that L`  G` P R` and G`nR`  o. 
Hence, given a set of agents 1, … , D!, a deontic 
interpreted system (DIS) is defined as the tuple: 
DIS  qG` , R` , Act` , P` , t```,…,E!, Gh , Rh , Acth , Ph , th, I, Vr 
The following language applies to a deontic interpreted 
system: 
φ t p|vφ| 
|φ w φ|EXφ|EGφ|ExφUψ{|K`φ|E}φ|C}φ|D}φ|Omφ|K }`φ 
With the language above, the interpreted systems provides 
semantics to reason about temporal and epistemic properties 
[21, 22]. In this grammar p  P is an atomic proposition, EX 
EG and EU are standard computation tree logic (CTL) 
operators [8]. The remaining CTL operators can be derived 
from the above. The formula K`φ A  1, … , D! expresses 
“agent A knows φ”. The symbol Γ denotes a group of agents. 
The formula E}φ expresses “everybody in group Γ 
knows φ ”; the formula C}φ expresses “ φ is common 
knowledge in group Γ ”; the formula D}φ  expresses “ φ is 
distributed knowledge in group Γ ”; the formula Omφ 
expresses that “under all the correct alternatives for 
agent A, φ holds”; lastly, the formula K }`φ expresses the 
knowledge that agent A has on the assumption that all agents 
in group Γ are functioning correctly. 
MCMAS inherently handles the interpretation of formulae 
by associating a Kripke model to the deontic interpreted 
systems. For further details on the Kripke model 
representation and the inductive definition of the satisfaction 
conditions, the reader is asked to refer to [21] and [22]. 
IV. TRANSLATION TOOL FROM DISCRETE EVENT SYSTEM TO 
MULTI-AGENT MODEL CHECKING 
E have developed a compiler for translation of the 
abstracted discrete multi-agent system (in the 
Stateflow formalism), into the deontic interpreted system 
representation (in MCMAS). 
Given a multi-agent system of D, D  : agents, the 
mapping function is denoted by 
NFI  UDX, FGH/, … , FGHE!, where FI is the 
Stateflow chart with parallel state decomposition. Due to this 
representation the states FGH/, … , FGHE! from this level of 
the hierarchy are active at the same time, hence the agents 
can evolve simultaneously. 
An agent A (A  1, … , D!, D  :) is described by the 
mapping function NFGH`  VS, [`/, … , [`!, where [`  I`  ,   1, … , !,   :) are local states of the 
respective agent. In this implementation the agent A is a 
superstate with exclusive state decomposition, whose 
substates are the agent’s local states. Superstate FGH` being 
of exclusive decomposition, only one of its local state can be 
active at a time. 
The finite set of actions for agent A is realized and defined 
as a group of functions JMH` that reside in and are declared 
local to the FGH` superstate. 
The actions that can be performed by an agent A in a given 
local state [`  is denoted by NMH`  JMH`  ,   1, … , !,  
:). When an action is performed within the local state, a 
transition with a triggered event label can be activated. If the 
source state of the transition is active, the transition is taken, 
thus enabling the agent to evolve from one local state to 
another. Hence, an event label can activate a transition using 
an underlying event broadcast mechanism that occures in a 
local state’s action. 
In terms of the LTS representation, the DIS (deontic 
interpreted system) evolution function implements the 
W
  
 
mapping from the predecessor states to succesor states.  
The local state of agent A in an initial global state is 
marked by assigning an [`  local state as default. 
 
There exists an inherent semantic equivalence relation ~ 
between the discrete Stateflow design and the deontic 
intepreted system representation. The following 
equivalencies can be stated: 
FGH` (parallel superstate) ~ agent A I` (substates of superstate FGH`) ~ L` (local states of 
agent A 
JMH` (group of functions local to superstate) ~ Act` 
(finite set of actions of agent A 
NMH`  JMH`  (functions that are called in action labels of a 
local states) ~ P`  (protocol function) 
LTS transition relation captured in Stateflow  ~ t` 
(evolution function) 
]  2\  ^  (configuration of the Stateflow chart) ~ G 
(global state) 
V. MODELLING EXAMPLE 
O illustrate the aforementioned Stateflow modelling and 
translation to the MCMAS’s input language, the 
example of the Collision and Obstacle Avoidance 
process/agent (see Fig. 3.) is presented [24, 25]. 
The sendLimitedHeadroom and sendObstacleAhead 
events are triggered by the actions taken by sensor agents. 
The sendLimitedHeadroom action is carried out when both, 
the vehicle’s altitude above seafloor and range to the ice 
overhead crosses a permitted threshold value. The 
sendObstacleAhead activity indicates that there is an 
obstruction on the vehicle’s path. 
Waiting is the active state during normal operation of the 
AUV, when the collision and obstacle avoidance is not 
taking any action [25]. When triggered by the 
sendLimitedHeadroom or sendObstacleAhead events, the 
state of the avoidance process switches to Retreating. The 
actions that can be taken in this state consists of a 180 
degree turn and a retreat along the same path the vehicle had 
come along, to a preset safe retreat distance. When the 
retreat distance is covered, the TryingNewTrack state is 
entered, during which the vehicle will try a new track, 
parallel to the original. If the vehicle encounters an obstacle, 
it will switch back to Retreating state. If the vehicle has 
covered a clearance distance on the alternative path, the 
obstacle avoidance process is finished, the TryingNewTrack 
state is exited and the Waiting state is entered. 
The following properties/requirements can be verified 
with the model checking tool, in relation with the collision 
and obstacle avoidance system: 
1) In case of the existence of an object in the vehicles 
flight path (forward direction) or in case of limited 
headroom (short range to the seafloor below or to the ice 
overhead), the vehicle will always turn and retreat on the 
same path where it has approached to its current position; 
T
Agent ObstacleAvoidance 
 
 Vars: 
  state : {StateTryingNewTrack,StateWaiting,StateRetreating}; 
 end Vars 
 
 RedStates: 
 end RedStates 
 
 Actions = 
{NoAction,TurnAndRetreat,RetreatDistanceCovered,TryNewTrack,Cleara
nceDistanceCovered}; 
 
 Protocol: 
  state=StateTryingNewTrack: 
{TryNewTrack,ClearanceDistanceCovered}; 
  state=StateWaiting: {NoAction}; 
  state=StateRetreating: {TurnAndRetreat,RetreatDistanceCovered}; 
 end Protocol 
 
 Evolution: 
  state=StateTryingNewTrack if 
(((ObstacleAvoidance.Action=RetreatDistanceCovered) and 
(state=StateRetreating)) or ((Sensor.Action=sendLimitedHeadroom) and 
(state=StateRetreating)) or ((Sensor.Action=sendObstacleAhead) and 
(state=StateRetreating))) 
  state=StateWaiting if 
((ObstacleAvoidance.Action=ClearanceDistanceCovered) and 
(state=StateTryingNewTrack)) 
  state=StateRetreating if (((Sensor.Action=sendLimitedHeadroom) 
and (state=StateTryingNewTrack)) or 
((Sensor.Action=sendObstacleAhead) and (state=StateTryingNewTrack)) 
or ((Sensor.Action=sendLimitedHeadroom) and (state=StateWaiting)) or 
((Sensor.Action=sendObstacleAhead) and (state=StateWaiting))) 
 end Evolution 
end Agent 
 
Fig. 4. Stateflow model translated into interpreted system programming 
language (ISPL) of MCMAS, showing the definition of the Obstacle 
Avoidance agent. 
 
Fig 3. Obstacle Avoidance Stateflow superstate. 
  
 
2) If the vehicle has not avoided the obstacle after a 
specific time duration since it first entered the Retreating 
state, the avoidance process will always signal such an 
avoidance failed circumstance to the mission controller, in 
order to look for an alternative solution to safeguard the 
vehicle. 
The above illustration is a very small portion of all AUV 
system operations. A more detailed example of the described 
IFAS modelling and verification methodology will be 
presented in a future publication. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
HIS paper has introduced a complete methodology 
(IFAS) for formal verification of complex autonomous 
engineering systems such as an autonomous underwater 
vehicle. Modelling can also include material and structural 
(static) properties of engineering subsystems selected, hence 
the approach is broader than formal checking of the control 
systems. Component failures, that may effect or endanger 
mission success, are represented as dicrete events in the 
MCMAS system. Reliability can be tested under various 
assumptions of component reliability and within the given 
limits of accuracy of the dicrete abstractions used for the 
environment and internal feedback loops. The multi-agent 
verification system used also allows the inclusion of all the 
network communications and behaviour of human 
controllers. 
Further work is concerned with extending the IFAS 
system to an iterative design process of autonomous 
vehicles. Also the human operator’s role as an agent will be 
a focus of our interest. Eliminating human errors by warning 
and safety systems is vitally important to mission success 
and to avoid loss of vehicles. 
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